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VERY LIGHT JETS IN THE NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM 
 
Barbara K. Burian, Ph.D. 
NASA Ames Research Center 
Moffett Field, California 
 
Problems that potential very light jet (VLJ) pilots of the future are having in the aircraft they currently fly, as 
evidenced in incident and accident reports, were analyzed.  Significant problems identified include poor crew/single 
pilot resource management, low currency, inadequate preflight planning, avionics use difficulties, and cognitive 




The introduction of very light jets (VLJs, sometimes 
referred to as Part 23 Jets) into the national airspace 
system poses many challenges for almost all aspects of 
the industry.  The pilots, some of whom may have 
minimal flight experience, will be operating at flight 
levels previously populated primarily by medium and 
large jet aircraft.  Currently, many of these pilots are 
flying light twin or advanced, single-engine piston 
aircraft, such as Diamond Twin Stars and Beech 
Bonanzas, often below 18,000 feet MSL.  Once in 
VLJs, they will be exposed to new types of weather and 
atmospheric conditions, must be able to operate much 
faster, technically advanced aircraft with systems and 
equipment with which they may have little previous 
experience (e.g., jet engines, pressurization), and will 
need to be able to operate primarily as single pilots.  
Other VLJ pilots will come from current professional 
pilot ranks (e.g., turboprop and business jet pilots) and 
will fly VLJs professionally, such as for air taxi 
companies.  VLJ instructors and pilot mentors will need 
to determine the most efficient and effective ways to 
instruct both populations of pilots.   
 
Through visits with VLJ manufacturers, the National 
Business Aviation Association (NBAA) Safety 
Committee identified 21 areas of greatest risk for the 
operation of very light jets that should be addressed 
during training (NBAA, 2005).  Some of these risk 
areas are presented in Table 1.  This study was 
undertaken to identify the kinds of problems that 
potential VLJ customers/pilots are having in the 
aircraft they currently fly and in the flight regimes in 
which VLJs will operate, as evidenced through 
incident and accident reports.  This analysis will 
augment our understanding of the difficulties this 
population is likely to face during VLJ operations 
and will broaden our understanding of some of the 




Reports of incidents and accidents involving four 
types of aircraft (advanced single-engine, light twin, 
business jet, and turboprop) and occurring over a 12-
month period (July 2005 though June 2006) were 
analyzed for this study.   
___________________________________________ 
Table 1. Selected NBAA VLJ Risk Areas (NBAA, 
2005)          
 
• Wake Turbulence Encounters 
• Inadequate Knowledge of High Altitude Weather 
• Physiological Effects of High-Altitude Operations 
• Jet Blast Damage Behind Larger Jets during 
Ground Operations 
• Inadequate Crosswind Takeoff/Landing 
Preparation 
• Inadequate Preparation for High-rate/High-speed 
Climbs 
• Low-fuel Arrivals Trying to Stretch Range 
• Single Pilot Adherence to Checklists 
• Inadequate Exercise of “Command” 
• Inadequate Land and Hold Short Preparation 
___________________________________________ 
 
Contextual and demographic information that were 
recorded included pilot hours of experience, lighting 
and weather conditions, aircraft type, and the phase 
of flight in which the event began or occurred.  
Information was also recorded about a wide range of 
other variables regarding what occurred in the 
incident or accident, such as flight path deviations, 
problems using avionics, cognitive performance and 
workload management problems, collisions, 
incursions, malfunctions, maintenance issues, and 
fatigue, among others. 
 
Incident data describing unsafe occurrences and 
hazardous situations were drawn from searches of 
reports filed with the Aviation Safety Reporting 
System (ASRS, 2006; ASRS, 2007).  Because ASRS 
reports are filed voluntarily, they cannot be used to 
infer prevalence or incidence rates of problems 
within aviation, although they can provide a rich 
description of the qualitative nature of these events 
helping us to better understand why they occurred.  
Additionally, some issues, such as confusion using 
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advanced avionics, may not have shown up in ASRS 
reports unless they had also led to some other 
problem, such as distraction leading to a flight path 
deviation (e.g., an “altitude bust”). 
 
Accident data were obtained through a search of the 
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB, 2006) 
on-line database of accident reports.  Only final 
reports in which Probable Cause determinations had 
been made were included in this study. As a 
consequence, accident data presented in this study 
cannot be directly compared with other studies of 
accident data, such as the Aircraft Owners and Pilots 
Association’s NALL Report (AOPA, 2006), that are 
conducted sufficiently long after accidents have 
occurred to maximize the number of reports that are 
final for the period of interest. 
 
Different kinds of information are prevalent in the 
two sources of data.  For example, 42 of the 46 
reports that identified problems with the completion 
of instrument procedures were ASRS incident 
reports.  Conversely, problems with aircraft control 
post-landing are far more prevalent in the NTSB 
reports than in ASRS reports, likely because the 
damage such problems produce is often substantial.   
Other issues, however, are represented fairly equally 
across the two types of reports (e.g., number of 
reports involving aircraft malfunctions: 42 out of 170 
ASRS reports, 58 out of 218 NTSB reports). 
 
Some variables of interest were not captured 
adequately by either source of data, however.  For 
example, many of the NBAA (2005) VLJ risk areas, 
such as Inadequate Land and Hold Short Preparation, 
were not captured well in the incident and accident 
data.  Therefore, analyses of only six topics related to 
the NBAA risk areas are reported below. 
 
Coding of some variables, such as type of aircraft and 
phase of flight (i.e., contextual variables) was very 
straightforward and required no interpretation.  Other 
variables however, such as high workload or memory 
problems, often required some subjective judgment 
during coding.  As a rule, coding of these variables 
was done conservatively.  Thus, these variables were 
only coded if the pilot made some mention of them 
(“I was distracted by the funny noise in the cabin.”) 
or if overwhelming evidence that they were present 
was provided in the report narratives. Therefore, the 
variables requiring some subjective judgment are 
likely underrepresented in the data analyzed.  
 
Several manufacturers are advocating VLJ training 
modeled after that given to professional pilots in 
commercial operations.  The motivation for this is 
that commercial aviation has a very good overall 
safety record and VLJ pilots will be operating in the 
same flight regimes with the same challenges as 
commercial pilots.  Therefore, in this study the types 
of problems encountered during private flights as 
compared to professional flights were of interest.  For 
the purpose of analysis, “private” or “general aviation 
(GA)” flights were those involving advanced single-
engine or light twin aircraft flown under Part 91 of 
the Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs).  
“Professional” flights were those involving single-
engine or light twin aircraft flown under FAR Part 
135 or Part 121 or those involving business jets or 
turboprop aircraft flown under FAR Part 91, Part 
135, or Part 121.  Although it is fairly safe to assume 
that most professional flights were flown by 
“professional” pilots (i.e., those who fly for a living), 
it is not safe to assume that most GA flights were 
flown by pilots who do not fly for a living; in other 
words, it is possible that some of the GA flights were 
flown by pilots who do fly professionally but were 
not doing so during the GA flight. 
 
Analyses reported below pertain to an overview of 
the data and contextual variables, six NBAA (2005) 





Contextual and Demographic Information 
 
Of the 388 reports coded for this study, 218 were NTSB 
accident reports and 170 were ASRS reports.  The data 
were comprised of reports involving 173 advanced 
single-engine aircraft (44.6%), 108 light twin aircraft 
(27.8%), 92 business jets (23.7%), and 15 turboprop 
aircraft (3.9%).  Significant differences were found for 
the type of aircraft by the type of report analyzed (X2 (3, 
N=388) = 127.18, p<.001).  Turboprop and light twin 
aircraft were fairly equally distributed across the two 
types of reports but advanced single-engine aircraft 
were represented to a significantly greater degree in the 
NTSB accident reports (n=141) and business jets were 
represented to a significantly greater degree in the 
ASRS incident reports (n=83). 
 
Most reports involved flights in visual meteorological 
conditions (VMC) (n=319, 82.2%) that occurred 
during daylight hours (n=305, 78.6%).  Reports were 
distributed across the three FAR Parts as follows: 
Part 91: n= 322, 83.0%; Part 135: n= 47, 12.1%; Part 
121: n= 18, 4.6%.   
 
Pilot hours of overall experience ranged from 40-
29,240 hours with a median of 2,600 hours.  Pilot 
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hours of experience in the specific type of aircraft in 
which they had the incident/accident (“time-in-type”) 
ranged from 1-9,000 hours with a median of 455 
hours.  In terms of recent experience, pilots logged 
between 0-390 hours in the 90 days prior to the 
incident/accident with a median of 63 hours. 
 
There were 20 accidents (9.2% of all NTSB reports) 
that involved fatalities resulting in a total of 33 
deaths.  Interestingly, none of the 39 reports 
involving off-airport landings resulted in fatalities. 
 
Using the scheme described earlier, 253 GA and 134 
professional flights were identified during analyses 
(one report had missing data and could not be placed 
into one of the two groups).  Of the GA flights, 164 
involved advanced single-engine aircraft and 89 
involved light twins.  Nine professional flights 
involved advanced single-engine aircraft, 18 involved 
light twins, 92 involved business jets, and 15 
involved turboprop aircraft.  The median number of 
hours of experience for the pilots of the GA and 
professional flights (respectively) was as follows:  
total time: 1700 and 5700; time-in-type: 300 and 700; 
and hours flown in the previous 90 days: 34 and 144. 
 
A significant difference between the two types of 
flights was found according to the type of report filed 
(ASRS or NTSB; X2 (1, n=387) = 68.72, p<.001).  
GA flights were involved in 42.6% (n=72) of the 
ASRS reports compared to 54.4% (n=97) that 
involved professional flights.  Conversely, 83.0% 
(n=181) of the NTSB accident reports involved GA 
flights compared to 17.0% (n=37) that involved 
professional flights. 
 
NBAA Risk Areas 
 
Inadequate Crosswind Takeoff/Landing Preparation. 
Of the 34 reports involving a sudden wind encounter 
such as a wind gust or downdraft (almost all 
occurring during takeoff or landing), 29 (85.3%) 
resulted in an accident.  Difficulty handling 
unexpected winds was significantly more likely to 
occur during GA flights (n=29, 85.3%) than during 
professional flights (n=5, 14.7%) (X2 (4, n=387) = 
10.83, p<.05).  Additionally, 44.4% (n=28) of the 63 
NTSB accident reports in which aircraft control was 
lost on the ground directly after landing (i.e., runway 
overrun, ground loop/departed side of the runway) 
involved crosswinds, wind gusts, and the like.  Thus, 
the management of gusts and crosswinds is born out 
as a risk area by the findings in this study but it 
should be kept in mind that smaller aircraft are also 
more vulnerable to problems with crosswind than 
larger and/or heavier aircraft. 
Inadequate Preparation for High Rate/Speed Climbs. 
Over half of the ASRS reports (n=87, 51.2%) and 
14.7% (n=32) of the NTSB reports involved flight 
path deviations.  Forty-two (31.3%) of the 134 
professional flights involved altitude deviations, two-
thirds of which occurred during climbout.  Although 
some of these altitude deviations were related to 
distractions or misunderstanding specific departure 
procedures, several appeared to be related to gaining 
altitude more quickly than was anticipated, as is 
illustrated by the following two quotes:  1) 
“Performed level-off based on non turbojet 
experience…” (Accession #690392; ASRS, 2006)   
2) “The pilot/owner/builder departed on his first solo 
flight in the homebuilt, jet-powered, Velocity Jet 900 
airplane with no jet airplane experience or training.  
After takeoff, the airplane climbed above the traffic 
pattern altitude at ‘4-5 thousand feet-per-minute’…” 
(Accident NYC06CA118; NTSB, 2006). 
 
Low Fuel Arrivals. Nineteen (8.7%) of the NTSB 
reports involved fuel starvation and two ASRS 
reports (1.2%) involved low fuel arrival events.  A 
significant relationship between low fuel arrivals/fuel 
starvation events and type of flight was found (X2 (1 
n=387) = 4.20, p<.05) with 19 GA flights and 2 
professional flights involved.   
 
Pilot currency (i.e., number of hours flown in the 
previous 90 days) and time-in-type experience were 
also found to be important relative to low fuel/fuel 
starvation events.  Half of the pilots who were 
involved in these flights (n=10) had flown 24 or 
fewer hours within the previous 90 days – that is an 
average of 2 hours or less per week.  Thirteen (68%) 
of the fuel starvation events involved pilots with 
fewer than the median number of hours of experience 
in their type of aircraft (median = 427 hours).  
However, those pilots in the lowest quartile (1-119 
hours) were involved in less than one third of those 
events (n=4).  Hence, nine low fuel/fuel starvation 
flights were flown by pilots in the second quartile 
with 120-427 hours in type.  One possible 
interpretation of these findings is that once pilots gain 
some (but not a lot) of experience in a new type of 
aircraft, they may become less conservative in their 
fuel estimates, management, or planning until after 
gaining a few hundred more hours of experience 
when they become a bit more conservative (or 
possibly more accurate) in their estimations and fuel 
management. 
 
Single Pilot Adherence to Checklists (and Preflight 
Inspection and Preparation Procedures). The only 
information available that clearly concerned checklist 
usage in the data was that landing checklists were not 
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used in 9 of the 16 gear-up landings that occurred – 
two during professional flights and seven during GA 
flights (however one of the nine gear-up landings 
also involved a gear malfunction).   
 
Closely related to the concern that single pilots may 
not be diligent in the completion of formal checklists 
is the concern that they may not consistently follow 
standard operating procedures (SOPs), which are 
credited with much of the safety that exists in 
commercial aviation operations.  Instances in which 
pilots completed inadequate (or non-existent) 
preflight inspections and planning (n=57, 14.7% of 
all reports) are examples of non-adherence to SOPs 
and were found equally in ASRS and NTSB reports.  
An off-airport landing was performed in 13 of the 29 
accidents (44.8%) in which the pilots failed to 
perform adequate preflight planning, with 10 of these 
landings (76.9%) due to fuel starvation. 
 
Pilots with all levels of recent experience engaged in 
insufficient preflight inspections or planning, though 
more of this behavior was evident in the reports 
involving pilots who fell below the median in terms 
of recent experience (n=29, 60.5%).  Additionally, 
70.2% (n=40) of the insufficient preflight events 
involved GA flights.  Although this certainly 
validates the concerns of the NBAA Safety 
Committee, it also means that almost 30% of 
incident/accident flights involving poor preflight 
were professional flights (n=17).  Thus, adherence to 
checklists and SOPs is not just a concern for single 
pilots or private pilots alone. 
 
Crew Resource Management/Single Pilot Resource 
Management (CRM/SRM).   One of the risk areas 
identified by the NBAA (2005) is “Inadequate 
Exercise of Command,” which includes concerns 
with crew or single pilot resource management 
(CRM/SRM).  Crew or single pilot resource 
management “refers to the effective use of all 
available resources: human resources, hardware, and 
information” (pg. 2, Federal Aviation Administration, 
2004). It includes effective communication processes, 
decision behavior, workload management, and 
conflict resolution; timely preparation and planning; 
and maintaining situational awareness.   Of the 388 
total reports analyzed, 113 (29.1%) revealed some 
sort of problem with CRM/SRM.   
 
Pilots of all experience and currency levels 
demonstrated problems with CRM/SRM.  For 
example, the median number of hours flown by poor 
CRM/SRM pilots in the previous 90 days was 75, 
median total hours was 4,425, and the median 
number of hours for time in aircraft type was 600.  
CRM/SRM problems were identified in 21.0% of GA 
flights and 37.3% of professional flights.   
 
Poor CRM/SRM decreases the margin of safety and 
is related to the existence of other problems in flight.  
For example, and not surprisingly, in this study a 
highly significant correlation between poor 
workload/time management (including poor 
CRM/SRM) and problems using avionics was found 
(r = .33, p<.001).  Similarly, poor CRM/SRM was 
identified in 60 reports of flight deviations, in 29 
reports involving landing difficulties, and in 9 of the 
20 fatal accidents (8 of which were GA flights). 
 
Weather. Most of the weather issues identified by the 
NBAA (2005) were not evident or cannot be assessed 
by analysis of the data used in this study (e.g., 
Inadequate Knowledge of High Altitude Weather).  
In-flight icing is of some concern to the NBAA and 
VLJ communities but there were few icing events 
recorded in the reports analyzed (n=8) and no 
significant difference was found between the 
numbers of private (n=5) and professional (n=3) 
pilots who had incidents/accidents in which icing 
played a role.  Of the 50 NTSB accidents that were 
weather-related (including icing), 39 resulted in some 
type of collision or incursion event, including 
controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) or in-flight 
collision with an object (n=12), hitting some type of 
object or terrain on the ground (n=26), or an in-flight 
break-up (n=1). 
 
Other Areas of Concern 
 
Cognitive Performance. Six different variables 
related to pilot cognitive performance were of 
particular interest in this study: distraction, memory 
problems, poor decision making, poor risk 
perception, lost situational awareness, and cognitive 
processing difficulty (e.g., confusion, difficulty 
performing mental calculations, habit capture, etc.).  
Although pilots flying GA and professional flights 
did not differ from each other, almost two-thirds 
(66.5%) of the reports coded involved at least one of 
these cognitive performance issues (n=258; ASRS 
n=118, NTSB n=140).  For example, not quite a third 
of the reports (n=121, 31.2%) involved the pilot 
losing situation awareness.   
 
It was not uncommon for pilots to experience more 
than one type of cognitive performance problem.  For 
example, cognitive processing problems, such as 
confusion, were found in 43.2% (n=48) of the reports 
in which poor decision-making was evident.  
Similarly, confusion or other such cognitive 
processing problems were found in 38% (n=46) of 
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the reports in which the pilot also lost situational 
awareness, and in 12 of the 17 events involving high 
workload (70.6%) situation awareness was lost.   
 
Cognitive performance difficulties are problematic in 
aviation because they directly affect safety.  Of the 
46 events involving pilot distraction, 31 (67.4%) 
resulted in flight path deviations.  Flight path 
deviations also occurred in 38.3% (n=54) of the 141 
reports involving cognitive processing difficulties 
(e.g., confusion) and in 56.2% (n=68) of the 121 
reports involving a loss of situational awareness.  
Recall that variables related to cognitive 
performance, workload, time management and 
similar problems required some subjective judgment 
and were coded conservatively; thus, these 
difficulties probably occurred far more often than are 
reported here. 
 
Avionics. VLJs will have highly advanced, integrated 
glass cockpits, so problems using avionics was also 
of interest in this study.  Forty-one reports (10.6%), 
all but two of them ASRS incident reports, involved 
some sort of problem with avionics use (e.g., 
confusion about how to use the equipment, 
misprogramming a GPS, etc.).   These problems 
occurred almost exclusively during three phases of 
flight: climbout, cruise, and arrival/approach.  
Climbout and arrival/approach are highly dynamic 
phases of flight and errors in programming or errors 
due to having one’s “head down” and programming 
on the fly (say, due to poor preflight planning or in 
response to ATC directives) are particularly likely to 
show up during these phases.  Thirty-three of the 41 
reports (80.5%) identifying at least one problem with 
avionics use also involved a flight path deviation. 
 
Problems with avionics use were strongly associated 
with cognitive performance problems.  In fact, 40 of 
the 41 reports recording at least one problem with the 
use of avionics also involved a loss of situation 
awareness (97.6%).  Some of these problems were 
related to not using the equipment correctly (e.g., 
wrong mode or display, misprogramming it), others 
were related to having one’s head down to program 
or trying to figure out how to use the avionics and 
losing track of other things that were happening.  
 
Currency. Lack of currency can be a safety risk for 
any pilot, and several types of problems involving 
potential VLJ pilots with fewer hours of recent 
experience were examined.  Recent experience data 
(i.e., pilot hours flown in the previous 90 days) were 
available for 331 flights (211 GA and 120 
professional) in the reports analyzed.  As reported 
earlier, hours flown in the previous 90 days ranged 
from 0-390 with a median of 63 hours.  As would be 
expected, 70.1% of pilots flying GA flights  fell 
below the overall median of recent experience and 
85.8% of pilots flying professional flights fell above 
the overall recent experience median (X2 (3, n=331) = 
103.84, p<.001). 
 
A significant relationship was also found between the 
amount of recent experience and the type of report 
(incident vs. accident; X2 (3, n=331) = 29.29, 
p<.001).  Pilots who fell within the lowest quartile in 
terms of recent experience (24 or fewer hours within 
the previous 90 days) were involved in 35.8% (n=62) 
of the NTSB accidents.  Of the 11 accidents resulting 
in fatalities (for which pilot currency data were 
available), six (54.5%) were flown by pilots with 24 
or fewer hours flown in the previous 90 days.  In 
other words, when currency could be determined, 
pilots who fell in the lowest quartile of recent 
experience flew over half of the fatal accidents. 
 
Less recent experience was also significantly related 
to CFIT accidents, in-flight collision with object 
accidents (e.g., radio tower), and collision with 
objects on the ground, as well as other problems 
related to landing an aircraft.  These findings are 
described below. 
 
Collisions and Incursions. Over half of the NTSB 
reports analyzed (n=134, 56.9%) involved some type 
of collision, near collision, or incursion (e.g., near 
mid-air collision, CFIT, in-flight collision with an 
object, runway incursion, bird/animal strike, hitting 
something while on the ground, etc.).  There was a 
significant relationship between hours flown in the 
previous 90 days and involvement in one of these 
types of events (X2 (21, n= 135) = 36.70, p<.05) with 
more of these events involving pilots with fewer 
hours of recent experience.   For example, 20.2% (n= 
44) of the 218 NTSB reports involved CFIT or in-
flight collision with object accidents; the median 
number of hours logged in the previous 90 days by 
the pilots involved in these events was 28.  Pilots 
who had logged fewer than 63 hours in the previous 
90 days (i.e., fell below the sample median of 63 
hours) were involved in 70.0% of these accidents.  
Similarly, 61.1% (n=44) of the events in which the 
pilot collided with something while on the ground 
(e.g., cars, buildings, fences, trees) involved those 
pilots below the overall median in terms of currency.   
 
Landing Problems. A substantial number of the 
NTSB accident reports analyzed (n=118, 54.1%) 
involved some type of problem during the landing 
phase of flight (e.g., hard landing, stalled it in, gear-
up landings not involving gear malfunctions, landing 
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short of the runway, etc.).  Over a quarter (n=63, 
28.9%) of the NTSB reports involved loss of aircraft 
control directly after landing (i.e., runway overrun, 
ground loop/departed side of the runway). There 
were also reports involving 32 gear-up landings but 
half (n=16) involved some type of landing gear 
malfunction.  Ten (35.7%) of the 32 gear-up landings 
were committed by pilots who fell in the lowest 
quartile in term of recent experience, but again, half 
(n=5) of these events involved some type of landing 
gear malfunction. 
 
Pilots in the lowest quartile of recent experience (i.e., 
24 or fewer hours logged within the previous 90 





The NBAA Safety Committee (2005) has identified a 
number of issues to be addressed during VLJ training 
and the findings of this study corroborate six of them.  
A significant number of pilots, particularly those 
flying as private pilots, had difficulty with landings, 
especially when in crosswind or gusty conditions.  
There were a number of altitude deviations and some 
were related to lack of preparation for a high rate of 
climb, as predicted by the NBAA, but other factors – 
particularly cognitive performance problems such as 
distraction or loss of situational awareness – were 
associated with these flight path deviations as well.   
 
Low fuel arrivals and fuel starvation accidents were 
found to be related to lack of (or minimal) recent 
experience as well as the amount of experience the 
pilots had in the type of aircraft they flew.  However, 
these events were also found to be associated with 
insufficient preflight planning, most often 
demonstrated by pilots who were not flying in a 
professional capacity. Thus, the industry concern that 
VLJ pilots adopt commercial airline practices in 
adherence to checklists and following SOPs is well 
placed.  However, pilots at all experience levels 
demonstrated poor checklist and preflight behavior and 
poor CRM/SRM, even those flying professionally, 
indicating that these are issues for all future VLJ pilots, 
no matter the type of flying they currently do. 
 
Cognitive performance problems were highly 
prevalent in the reports analyzed and were related to 
a wide range of other problems.  The data strongly 
suggest that to adequately address the other issues 
identified, cognitive performance issues such as 
dealing with distractions, maintaining situational 
awareness even while multitasking, and minimizing 
sources of confusion must also be addressed.   
Although advanced avionics have the potential to 
greatly reduce workload and significantly increase 
safety, this is true only if the avionics are well-
designed (with context of use in mind and in keeping 
with human factors principles) and only once their 
use is well understood and well practiced.   It is often 
claimed that advanced avionics increase pilots’ 
situational awareness, however, they also have the 
potential to decrease it, as was found in this study. 
 
In addition to cognitive performance, the issue of 
currency is extremely important, especially for those 
pilots for whom the transition to a VLJ is a 
significant change from the aircraft they currently fly.  
In this study, fewer hours of recent experience was 
associated with a number of different problems (e.g., 
off airport landings, CFIT accidents, problems during 
landing).  Maintaining currency in VLJs must be 
addressed, in addition to initial and recurrent training, 
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